Over the last two decades, analysts have increasingly described the PRC’s “Qiaowu” as the “largest diasporic influence operation in history,” with increasingly alarmist examples of the Overseas Chinese manipulating local politics in Europe, the US, and Australia. In the case of Malaysia, the Overseas Chinese exhibit contradictory tendencies. On one hand, they demonstrate an overwhelming sympathy to Beijing’s foreign policy objectives much like their Western counterparts, further strengthened by growing Qiaowu initiatives. But a deeper inspection reveals that – unlike their Western counterparts – they are unwilling to act on this sympathy: they consistently vote against the PRC’s interests, refuse to protest any of Beijing’s foreign policy interests, and are ironically co-opted by local Malay elites to attract Chinese investments. This case study – on the country with the largest ethnic-Chinese minority in the world – suggests that the Southeast Asian Overseas Chinese might operate under a different political logic than prior research has suggested in the West. 

Since 2014, a growing tide of analysts have argued the Overseas Chinese have become – in the words of senior Chinese officials – the “diplomatic vanguard” of China’s soft power operations. According to James To, the overarching Qiaowu foreign policy framework views the ethnic-Chinese diaspora as a treasure trove of human talent and investments, “a lobby group opposing Taiwanese independence, and as soft power promoters of Chinese pride, culture, and confidence.” Since Chinese foreign policy also often relies on the principle of person-to-person networking, the Chinese diaspora often serves as an ideal intermediary into the business networks and political structures of foreign countries. While these claims are somewhat alarmist, publicly available information does suggest an overwhelming network of state organs, millions of dollars in funding, and public statements that have increasingly called for a greater role of the Overseas Chinese, in what Charon & Vilmer describe as the “largest diasporic influence operation in history.” 

Moreover, this growing body of literature has traced Qiaowu’s tangible effects across the “Western” world. In 2020, CCP-associated organisations in Melbourne mobilised protests against the Hague’s verdict on the South China Sea and later on Hong Kong, with the latter erupting into a violent conflict with more than two hundred people. In New Zealand, the Chinese embassy and related organs have repeatedly mobilised “rent-a-mob” Overseas Chinese to protest against pro-Falun Gong and pro-Tibet movements. During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 20,000 Chinese students assembled in Canberra to welcome the Olympic torch and physically suppress pro-Tibet protesters. In the U.S., New Zealand, and Australia, Overseas Chinese in all these countries have illegally channelled CCP funding towards pro-Beijing politicians, reportedly skewing local elections and threatening those who investigate the operation. In the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Sweden the CCP has gradually acquired and re-shaped the once pluralistic, pro-Taiwan Mandarin mediascape into “vessels” reproducing mainland narratives.  In these case studies, Qiaowu seems to have met some success despite most of these countries having extremely small Overseas Chinese populations, each less than 5% of the population.

The question then emerges – to what extent might this pattern apply to Southeast Asia, where nearly 80% of the world’s Overseas Chinese reside? Of these countries, one particular example might present the ripest example of Qiaowu’s success: Malaysia. Demographically, Chinese-Malaysians make 22.8% of the overall population, forming the largest proportion of an ethnic-Chinese minority in the world. Economically, their business elites dominate Malaysia’s private sector, spearhead trade between China and Malaysia, and could feasibly exert financial influence over the Malaysian government. Culturally, Chinese-Malaysians are arguably the least assimilated Chinese minority in Southeast Asia, buttressed by unique systems of Mandarin vernacular education, Mandarin media, and powerful pro-China business interests. Local researchers – Ren & Liu, Ngeow & Tan, Ngeow, and Ngu & Ngeow – have similarly demonstrated that Qiaowu operations are not only active, but have secured influence over Chinese-Malaysian business associations, cultural centres, and Mandarin media companies to strengthen Chinese-Malaysian ties to the mainland. Additionally, Chinese-Malaysians already show extremely high approval ratings of the mainland. A 2022 Merdeka Center survey revealed that 67% of all Chinese-Malaysians held a favourable impression of China, significantly higher than the ethnic-Malay 28% approval rating. A 2022 Pew Research Survey revealed that 60% of Malaysians expressed a favourable opinion of China, second only to Singapore (with a majority Chinese population) and 20% higher than its closest competitor.

Simultaneously, Malaysia’s foreign policy has been quietly cleaving towards China over the last decade. In 2019, Malaysia was the second-largest recipient of BRI funding in the world, such that one of its own ministers described the nation as “ground zero” for BRI in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Malaysia and the PRC have long-running territorial disputes over territory in the South China Sea, but in 2019, Prime Minister Mahathir acceded to Chinese demands to negotiate territorial disputes in the South China Sea bilaterally, rather than as a collective ASEAN bargaining bloc. Although Malaysia certainly “hedges” between the U.S. and China and often intentionally plays the two against one another as Kuik described in 2008, it is becoming increasingly entangled with China through trade. Most analysts recognize these policy decisions are by no means orchestrated by a cabal of Chinese-Malaysians, and more likely stem from a pragmatic, economic calculus. Nevertheless, this economic dependence is certainly facilitated by the powerful Chinese-Malaysian business associations, often leveraging their connections and linguistic affinities to build profitable deals with the mainland. As increasingly alarmist authors draw attention to Chinese influence operations, it becomes easy to draw a line from the large population and high sympathy of Chinese-Malaysians to Malaysia’s tilt towards Beijing. 

However, increasing evidence might push back against such a seemingly intuitive causal connection. Chinese-Malaysians – unlike the Overseas Chinese communities in New Zealand, Australia, and the West that have mostly migrated in the last two generations – have lived, acculturated, and been born in Malaysia since the 1800-1900s. While they do sustain strong economic and linguistic ties with the mainland, few have any interest in abandoning Malaysia for China, and identify primarily as Malaysian. This longer history in Malaysia is not mutually exclusive with sympathy towards China, but it may potentially mitigate their willingness to politically act on that sympathy when it conflicts with their domestic interests. 

More importantly, analysts have yet to provide direct evidence that high degrees of sympathy and Qiaowu activity correlate to a pro-China foreign policy in Malaysia, and in fact, empirical data suggests the opposite. More specifically, analysts typically provide three mechanisms by which Overseas Chinese sympathy materialises into political influence: elections (through bloc-voting or candidate endorsements; protests (aligned with Beijing’s foreign interests); and elite-level lobbying (typically for BRI projects). Unlike most prior case studies, none have meaningfully emerged in Malaysia. 

Electoral Influence

Ostensibly, Malaysia is in similar straits to Australia, New Zealand, and the US, with both PRC-tied media outlets and embassies attempting to persuade Chinese-Malaysians to vote in Beijing’s interests. Indeed, CCP-linked businesses have acquired 90% of Chinese vernacular media in Malaysia, and in 2018, the Chinese embassy in Malaysia publicly endorsed a pro-Beijing party. If the Qiaowu-centric approach is applicable to Southeast Asia, then there should be both indications of the CCP directing Chinese-Malaysians to vote for pro-Beijing politicians, and at least some indication that Chinese-Malaysians are in fact voting for the CCP’s preferred politicians. 

But while the groundwork may be set, Chinese-Malaysians have consistently voted against PRC interests in the last two decades. This does not refute the fact that Chinese-Malaysians view China favourably, but rather, that their domestic interests – supporting democratic parties to fight against Malay ethno-nationalism – take precedence before any overseas sympathy. In 2018 and 2022, the Malay-nationalist party consistently was more aligned with China and at times even had the PRC’s explicit backing, but in each instance, the opposition party – no matter how critical of China – would win the overwhelming support of Chinese-Malaysians. 

For example, in the runup to the 2018 election, the issue of BRI projects quickly became a crucial clashpoint of both coalitions, with almost every BRI project in Malaysia being spearheaded and touted by Prime Minister Najib Razak from the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. Beyond just infrastructure projects, BN – and particularly its Malay-majority party UMNO – enjoyed robust and exclusive party-to-party ties with the CCP, with a dizzying network of Memoranda of Understanding, institutionalised visits, high-level exchanges, governance training, and interpersonal relationships. This was by no means a one-sided relationship; the Chinese embassy in Malaysia recommended Malaysians to vote for BN in 2018. Similar to Qiaowu in Australia and New Zealand, the PRC was attempting to use bloc-voting to their advantage by endorsing the most pro-Beijing candidate. 

Meanwhile, the opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH), had no relationship at all with the CCP prior to 2018, and their scathing criticisms of BRI and Chinese investment became a major platform of their campaign. Mahathir Mohamad, PH’s candidate for Prime Minister in 2018, spearheaded the attack on Chinese investment. He accused Najib of “selling Malaysia’s sovereignty to China” through BRI projects and property deals (Nambiar 2019), flagged the strong connections between Najib’s notorious 1MDB scandal with $23 billion worth of rail and pipeline deals with China, and flagged BRI projects as a “new version of colonialism.” These were by no means empty words; after winning the election in 2018, he proceeded to either re-negotiate or outright cancel $11.58 billion worth of BRI projects. Mahathir was not the only one in his coalition with a more critical approach to Beijing. Although theoretically multi-ethnic, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is widely regarded as the banner party of Chinese-Malaysians within PH, and while not as strident as Mahathir, implicitly signalled their opposition to CCP authoritarianism through several symbolic gestures. During a local interview of Wang Dan, one of the most prominent activists in the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, DAP sent representatives to attend, while BN’s MCA was noticeably absent. While perhaps more critical of Najib’s corruption than the CCP itself, members of the DAP similarly questioned the absence of feasibility studies, the suspicious lack of transparency, and unnecessary loans in the Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline project between Malaysia and China.

With this clear dichotomy between an explicitly CCP-approved coalition and an explicitly anti-CCP coalition, the results are all the more striking. According to the Merdeka Center’s survey conducted days before the election, they estimated that BN won 14.7% of the Chinese-Malaysian vote, while PH seized a landslide 84.2%, the highest in their history. Local news reports state that the actual number in the election might have been even higher, with 95% of Chinese voters siding with PH, but do not indicate their sources. As mentioned earlier, this does not refute the idea that Chinese-Malaysians view BRI favourably; Mahathir’s strong condemnation of Chinese loans might even be read as a strategic tradeoff of Chinese-Malaysian preferences for Malay votes. Nevertheless, when voting based on a basket of issues, Chinese-Malaysians decided that the domestic outweighed the international. 

In 2022, the Chinese-Malaysian polling again overwhelmingly favoured PH. Analysts Mohamad and Suffian, using a combination of five national surveys from the Merdeka Center and daily tracking surveys during the electoral campaigns estimate that 95% of Chinese voted for PH. Another estimate by Malaysian analyst Bridget Welsh estimates that PH again won around 95% of Chinese-Malaysian votes, BN won 4%, and PN won under 1%. To be clear, both of these are approximations based on pre-election surveys, but their consensus suggests the closest possible approximation given that more granular data is not available. Admittedly, this division is not quite as analytically significant as the 2018 election, as the most pro-Beijing party had somewhat blurred between 2018 and 2022. Nevertheless, PH was undeniably more sceptical of China at this period, and still won the Chinese vote. Put more bluntly, for the last five years, the Chinese-Malaysians have used none of their democratic and political power to sway Malaysia towards a more pro-Beijing direction, and have indirectly steered Malaysia further and further away from China. The impact of their vote, if not the intent, has run counter to Qiaowu’s goals. 

Protests

Protests make up the most eye-catching evidence of Qiaowu operations subverting local politics, a visual representation of how the Overseas Chinese might physically advance the CCP’s interests. However, despite a year of local fieldwork, interviews with relevant Malaysian activist networks, and meticulous desktop research, these protests simply have not happened in Malaysia. On the contrary, the protests led by Overseas Chinese are exclusively anti-PRC. The exact reasons for this are difficult to verify. Based on how most protests emerge in places with high levels of recent Overseas Chinese migrants, it is possible that the more acculturated, embedded Chinese-Malaysian population are more resistant to these forms of political action, and remain internally sympathetic to China but externally apathetic. Alternatively, perhaps they are more cognizant of Malay-nationalist backlash, and recognize that their desired political action would only further aggravate racialized politics and policies domestically. Regardless, anti-China protests exist and are overwhelmingly dominated by Chinese-Malaysians; pro-China protests simply do not exist. 

In fact, other forms of Chinese-Malaysian activism – even those focused on local democratic rights rather than China – have formally expressed solidarity with Hong Kong. In both official statements and anonymous interviews, Chinese-Malaysian pro-democracy protesters describe being directly inspired by the Hong Kong protests, due to the striking visual similarities in BN’s suppression of protests in Malaysia and the CCP’s response to the Umbrella Movement, both involving tear gas and extensive police brutality. While no studies are available to gauge the extent to which the youths are opposing China or their precise reasons, it is at least clear that the Chinese-Malaysian youths who do actively protest are exclusively pro-democracy.

It is undeniable that the Overseas Chinese serve as a prominent intermediary for China-Malaysia BRI Projects, often connecting China-Malaysia business networks under the direct auspices of the PRC. But despite this invaluable role, academics also emphasise Malaysia’s uniquely Malay-supremacist political system, and how Malay dominance over GLC’s have thrust them as the primary decision-makers in BRI deals. In particular, Liu & Lim’s ground-breaking study used three Malaysian BRI deals as case studies to argue that these projects only succeed when they catered to Malay constituencies, aligned to Malay nationalist political attitudes, and were spearheaded by Malay elites. Moving beyond these limited case studies and this narrow “success-failure” framework, an unpublished academic study traced the ownership structures and history of all eight major projects: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), Forest City, Melaka Gateway, Kuantan Port, Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline (TSGP), and the Multi-Product Pipeline  (MPP). According to the author, seven out of eight were directly initiated by Malay elites, and all were strongly endorsed by Malay elites and ministers who staked their reputation and wanted to be viewed as personally responsible for the projects. 

Admittedly, private companies led by Chinese-Malaysians played a crucial role facilitating at least two of these projects. Moreover, there was likely some private lobbying likely connected to the PRC and their extensive Chinese-Malaysian contacts. Still, Malay elites – including four Prime Ministers, the Sultan of Johor, and numerous local-level officials – all sought to be the public face of each project, and sought to emphasise their centrality in orchestrating these projects. According to anonymous interview sources working closely on these projects, Malay elites have begun to deliberately cut out Chinese-Malaysian middlemen, using them as a follow-up liaisons after the deals are already set in motion. But even if these elites were not the precise origin of the projects, they are by no means hesitant participants, but have deliberately and publicly commandeered these projects for their own benefit. At times, they acted out of personal incentives such as covering up embezzlement or strategic property investments; at other times, they secured votes from the Malay heartlands. These motivations would stand even without Chinese-Malaysian business lobbying. Altogether, the sympathy of the ethnic Chinese, then, is certainly important, but ultimately redundant to the sympathy of the Malay elites. 

At first, this claim may not appear falsifiable. All BRI projects by definition require public sector participation, and if the government is predominantly controlled by Malay elites, then by definition all BRI projects will be initiated by Malay elites. However, if Malay elites were reluctant and unenthusiastic participants, Malaysia would not be the largest recipient of BRI funding in Southeast Asia, and the second-largest in the world. Alternatively, Malay elites might be approving these projects out of economic necessity, but if so they would not stake their political legitimacy and personal investments on these projects, both of which have occurred in virtually all projects. Moreover, even when Malay elites critique specific BRI deals, they almost always assign blame to other Malay elites, as though further affirming the idea that Malay elites are the architects of Malaysia’s modern approach towards China. 

Elite-Level Lobbying

It is undeniable that the Overseas Chinese serve as a prominent intermediary for China-Malaysia BRI Projects, often connecting China-Malaysia business networks under the direct auspices of the PRC. But despite this invaluable role, academics also emphasise Malaysia’s uniquely Malay-supremacist political system, and how Malay dominance over GLC’s have thrust them as the primary decision-makers in BRI deals. In particular, Liu & Lim’s ground-breaking study used three Malaysian BRI deals as case studies to argue that these projects only succeed when they catered to Malay constituencies, aligned to Malay nationalist political attitudes, and were spearheaded by Malay elites. Moving beyond these limited case studies and this narrow “success-failure” framework, an unpublished academic study traced the ownership structures and history of all eight major projects: East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), Forest City, Melaka Gateway, Kuantan Port, Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline (TSGP), and the Multi-Product Pipeline  (MPP). According to the author, seven out of eight were directly initiated by Malay elites, and all were strongly endorsed by Malay elites and ministers who staked their reputation and wanted to be viewed as personally responsible for the projects. 

Admittedly, private companies led by Chinese-Malaysians played a crucial role facilitating at least two of these projects. Moreover, there was likely some private lobbying likely connected to the PRC and their extensive Chinese-Malaysian contacts. Still, Malay elites – including four Prime Ministers, the Sultan of Johor, and numerous local-level officials – all sought to be the public face of each project, and sought to emphasise their centrality in orchestrating these projects. According to anonymous interview sources working closely on these projects, Malay elites have begun to deliberately cut out Chinese-Malaysian middlemen, using them as a follow-up liaisons after the deals are already set in motion. But even if these elites were not the precise origin of the projects, they are by no means hesitant participants, but have deliberately and publicly commandeered these projects for their own benefit. At times, they acted out of personal incentives such as covering up embezzlement or strategic property investments; at other times, they secured votes from the Malay heartlands. These motivations would stand even without Chinese-Malaysian business lobbying. Altogether, the sympathy of the ethnic Chinese, then, is certainly important, but ultimately redundant to the sympathy of the Malay elites. 

At first, this claim may not appear falsifiable. All BRI projects by definition require public sector participation, and if the government is predominantly controlled by Malay elites, then by definition all BRI projects will be initiated by Malay elites. However, if Malay elites were reluctant and unenthusiastic participants, Malaysia would not be the largest recipient of BRI funding in Southeast Asia, and the second-largest in the world. Alternatively, Malay elites might be approving these projects out of economic necessity, but if so they would not stake their political legitimacy and personal investments on these projects, both of which have occurred in virtually all projects. Moreover, even when Malay elites critique specific BRI deals, they almost always assign blame to other Malay elites, as though further affirming the idea that Malay elites are the architects of Malaysia’s modern approach towards China. 

Concluding Thoughts

While Qiaowu is very much active across Malaysia and Chinese-Malaysians demonstrate a profound sympathy for mainland politics, this assessment must recognise two caveats. Firstly, because the Chinese-Malaysian community is at least politically invested in their country of birth, their sympathy is not causally linked with pro-Beijing voting trends or activism. Instead, when pitted between their abstract sympathy and domestic concerns, they have consistently chosen themselves. This does not mean Qiaowu is completely ineffective in mobilising the masses, but merely that Qiaowu is extremely dependent on local politics and must align with pre-existing interests. 

Secondly, the enthusiasm of Malay elites for the economic benefits of BRI have rendered Chinese-Malaysian sympathy increasingly redundant. They play a supportive role in these projects, but at the initiation and behest of Malay elites. Moreover, there seems to be a tremendous amount of continuity in these projects. Mahathir – who ran a virulently China-sceptic campaign – in the end only cancelled the pipeline projects, and merely renegotiated the ECRL. Muhyiddin, Yakoob, and even PH’s current PM, Anwar Ibrahim, have all demonstrated a broadly China-friendly approach, and do not seem interested in dismantling BRI projects as long as they are not tied to corruption scandals. Despite their wide range of attitudes towards China, all of these coalitions and Prime Ministers have welcomed BRI projects, and will likely continue to do so as long as China remains the economic hegemon of the Pacific. Rather than evaluating the impact of Qiaowu based on the size or sympathy of the Overseas Chinese community, research should focus more on ethnic and political majorities. These majorities are the ultimate arbiters of a state’s foreign policy, and in a sense, they too can exert their agency and co-opt available Qiaowu and Overseas Chinese opportunities. 

This is not limited solely to Malaysia. Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines have large Overseas Chinese communities, and are similar targets of Qiaowu. Moreover, these communities have a far smaller Overseas Chinese population proportionate to their overall population, and are thus even more culturally and politically embedded than their Malaysian counterparts. Thus, Qiaowu in those countries would theoretically face even greater obstacles in mobilising Overseas Chinese voters or protesters, and is even more reliant on ethnic majorities to influence local politics. In Singapore, the situation is even more inexplicable. The Overseas Chinese make up the majority of the population, and the nation shows even stronger approval ratings of the PRC than even Malaysia. And yet, the state upholds a colder – or at least more “neutral” – approach to China than Malaysia. Clearly, sympathy has been disrupted by local factors that alarmists rarely account for, warranting its own separate study. Moreover, while some Overseas Chinese in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand have been implicated in Qiaowu operations, the majority of these communities are growing roots in local communities, and will increasingly resemble the locally embedded Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia. As this process unfolds, sympathy may become increasingly insignificant. As the unexpected outcomes in Malaysia might suggest, the Overseas Chinese of each country should be studied on each country’s terms.

Image credits: Wikimedia Commons

The author has requested to remain anonymous.