China’s growing economic footprint in the Middle East has not been matched by a corresponding geopolitical strategy capable of navigating the region’s persistent security dilemmas. In fact, Beijing’s adherence to non-intervention, quasi-mediatory diplomacy, and strategic risk aversion has constrained its ability to shape regional outcomes, ultimately limiting its influence at critical moments of crisis.

In recent years, Chinese leaders have increasingly emphasized the positive outcomes of sidelining geopolitical conflicts in favor of promoting and expanding geo-economic opportunities. This trend has manifested in a growing effort to advocate for Chinese solutions to regional conflicts. However, certain regional incidents and crises in the Middle East have demonstrated that the region’s political-security dilemmas are still primarily resolvable through the classical logic of power and geopolitical approaches. The predominance of this mindset in the strategic thinking of Chinese leaders stems from the resilience of certain concepts and intellectual foundations within the country’s principles of peaceful foreign policy, as well as from several externally rooted factors. An excessive insistence on the principles of peaceful coexistence—such as non-intervention, quasi-mediatory diplomacy, fear arising from the West’s successive failures in resolving regional crises, the free-rider syndrome within the Western security architecture, an intense focus on the Taiwan conflict, and the lack of necessary military capabilities for simultaneous engagement in multiple geographic regions—constitute the most significant factors preventing China from adopting a geopolitical approach in the Middle East. In line with its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China calls for respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention, alongside diplomatic and peaceful solutions to conflicts and tensions.

The persistence of such conceptual frameworks at the domestic level severely constrains China’s foreign policy options abroad. The transformation of mediatory diplomacy into a form of quasi-mediatory diplomacy, along with the avoidance of any military alliances or coalitions, ranks among the most significant consequences of this dynamic. In practice, China’s mediation policy has assumed a quasi-mediatory character due to two specific features: instead of resolving conflicts, it focuses on conflict management to selfishly and excessively secure its own interests; and rather than setting the agenda, it follows pre-established agendas to avoid deep engagement in crises. This approach is shaped by a logic of extreme utilitarianism and an effort to evade security traps in the region. Nevertheless, it significantly diminishes China’s effective influence in resolving crises while enhancing the role of rival powers, such as the United States, in their resolution.

The October 7 war and the subsequent series of security crises, such as the Red Sea crisis, serve as major tests for evaluating the success of China’s policies in the region. For decades, China has been a steadfast supporter of Palestine in international forums and a significant partner for Israel in economic and technological fields. In 2017, Beijing elevated its relations with Israel to a “Comprehensive Innovative Partnership.” Such positive relations with both sides were a product of China’s mediatory diplomacy. However, the outbreak of the October 7 war confronted China’s quasi-mediatory diplomacy with a form of duality and its ensuing negative consequences. In this situation, neither side was fully satisfied with China’s conduct, nor were they completely dissatisfied.

In October 2023, the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a statement regarding Beijing’s failure to condemn Hamas’s attack on the country: “The ambassador expressed Israel’s deep disappointment with China’s statements and declarations regarding the recent events in the south, which included no explicit condemnation of the horrific Hamas massacre of innocent civilians and the abduction of dozens of them to Gaza.”

Indeed, the failure to condemn Hamas’s attack had multiple repercussions. On one hand, it severely diminished China’s credibility in Israel’s view, elevated Hamas’s status as a representative of the Palestinian people, and created a contradiction with the positions of influential Arab partners such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, who condemned Hamas. On the other hand, the absence of an explicit reaction condemning Israeli attacks, coupled with the decisive entry of the United States to control the Red Sea crisis and China’s refusal to join the naval coalition against the Houthis, made regional leaders—particularly Arab states—realize Beijing’s inability to play the role of a responsible power or a reliable ally at critical junctures of conflict. Beijing’s meager $4 million aid to Palestinians in Gaza, compared to the increasing assistance from Western governments, further exposed the rhetorical nature of China’s support for Palestine. The negative repercussions of this approach have also extended to China’s economic interests in the region. During the Bab el-Mandeb Strait conflicts, transportation and insurance costs for a standard container shipped from China to Europe increased from $1,500 to $4,000. This is particularly significant given that the majority of China’s trade with the European Union is conducted via the Red Sea.

China’s concern over the intersection of its economic interests with regional crises has functioned as a form of risk aversion, creating a formidable barrier to decisive engagement in managing and resolving conflicts in the region. The entanglement of Western powers, such as the United States, in the quagmire of security crises like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has served as a cautionary lesson for Chinese decision-makers. Most Chinese political leaders and scholars frequently assert that the Middle East is the “graveyard of empires,” noting that numerous great empires throughout history have met their demise following involvement in the region.

This issue has produced two major consequences:a relative indifference toward instability in the Middle East, so long as China’s interests are not maximally harmed; and an increasing reliance on a form of free-riding on the margins of the Western security architecture. In the long run, this has generated a kind of security dependence on that Western security framework for China. Under such conditions, if China remains committed to its principle of non-intervention, it may leave the shaping of future regional stability to other actors. Such an outcome could be detrimental to China, particularly if that order is shaped by a rival such as the United States. Moreover, any Western security retrenchment from the region, in the absence of a substitute security order, could suddenly and unexpectedly endanger China’s interests.

China’s intense focus on the Taiwan conflict, along with insufficient military capacity to simultaneously protect Beijing’s interests and assets across multiple geographical regions, constitutes another dimension of its restrained geopolitical posture in the Middle East. Over the past decade, the formulation of a “marching westward” strategy toward the Middle East has been among the most significant initiatives advanced within Chinese policy circles, aimed at disrupting the United States’ strategic concentration on China’s surrounding regions. Nevertheless, in recent years, the government of Xi Jinping appears to have concentrated the bulk of its military and logistical capabilities in the East China Sea and around Taiwan.

The growing frequency of China’s air and naval exercises between 2020 and 2023 suggests that the United States has been successful in constraining Beijing’s military capabilities within its immediate strategic environment. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense in 2023, the Chinese Communist Party has intensified grey-zone warfare against Taiwan, filling the areas around this democratic island with balloons, drones, and military vessels. This situation, on the one hand, increases China’s military focus on Taiwan and its immediate periphery, and on the other, reduces its military concentration in the Middle East.

The absence of military alliances with regional powers, together with weaknesses and shortages in logistical and military infrastructure in the Middle East compared with Western rivals such as the United States, has further limited Beijing’s military influence in the region. In reality, Washington’s military bases encircle much of the Middle East. By contrast, China’s only formal military facility in the region is its dual-use base in Djibouti, which—relative to Western military infrastructure—offers far more limited capacity for supporting large-scale conventional military operations. 

Unless Beijing recalibrates the balance between its geo-economic priorities and a more engaged geopolitical posture, it is likely to remain a consequential economic stakeholder but a peripheral strategic actor in shaping the evolving order of the Middle East. 

Image credits: Photo by Zalfa Imani on Unsplash

Mohammadreza Mohammadi
Mohammadreza is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Tehran University of Science and Research, Iran. With a dedicated focus on the Middle East since 2015, he has authored and translated over 10 books and published more than 15 scholarly articles in his field. His expertise encompasses issues related to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, crisis studies and Iran Issues. Currently, he serves as a university lecturer, Vice President of the Center for Future Research of the Islamic World (IIWFS), and Associate Editor of the scientific journal Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World.