In recent years, China has sought to portray itself in the Middle East as a power fundamentally different from the West—one that emphasizes trade, investment, diplomacy, and respect for state sovereignty rather than military intervention. This image was reinforced following Beijing’s mediation of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. Yet the security crises of recent years raise a more consequential question: Can China transform its considerable economic and diplomatic power into an effective capacity for managing security crises in the Middle East? The experience of the Gaza war, the Red Sea crisis, and the war against Iran suggests that a significant gap remains between possessing power and accepting the costs of exercising it. China’s growing emphasis on the positive consequences of its regional engagement, while downplaying underlying geopolitical contradictions, has contributed to the promotion of Chinese approaches to conflict management. Yet recent developments have demonstrated that many of the Middle East’s political and security problems remain deeply rooted in classical power politics and therefore require solutions with a distinctly geopolitical character.
The persistence of such thinking within China’s strategic community can be attributed partly to deeply embedded ideas and intellectual foundations within the country’s foreign-policy doctrine of peaceful coexistence, as well as to several external considerations. Beijing’s strong commitment to principles such as non-interference, diplomatic mediation, and peaceful coexistence; its concern over the repeated failures of Western powers to resolve regional crises; its tendency to free-ride on the Western security architecture; its strategic concentration on the Taiwan question; and its limited military capacity to become simultaneously engaged across multiple geographical theatres constitute some of the principal factors shaping China’s geopolitical restraint in the Middle East. China’s commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence emphasizes respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, and diplomatic and peaceful solutions to conflicts and tensions. The persistence of these principles at the domestic and strategic levels significantly constrains Beijing’s foreign-policy options abroad. The transformation of China’s mediation diplomacy into a form of quasi-mediation, coupled with its reluctance to enter military alliances or security coalitions, represents one of the most important consequences of this constraint.
In practice, China’s mediation policy has increasingly acquired the characteristics of quasi-mediation for two principal reasons. First, rather than resolving underlying conflicts, Beijing often prioritizes conflict management in ways that protect its own interests. Second, instead of actively setting the agenda, it tends to operate within pre-existing diplomatic frameworks designed to prevent deeper involvement in regional crises. This approach reflects an intensely interest-driven logic and a desire to avoid security traps in the region. At the same time, however, it significantly limits China’s ability to exercise effective influence over the resolution of crises and increases the relative role of rival powers, particularly the United States. The October 7, 2023 attacks and the subsequent chain of security crises—including the conflict in Gaza and the Red Sea crisis—provided important tests of the effectiveness of China’s regional policy. For decades, Beijing had maintained a position supportive of the Palestinian cause in international forums while simultaneously developing significant economic and technological relations with Israel. In 2017, China elevated its relationship with Israel to an Innovative Comprehensive Partnership. Maintaining constructive relations with both sides had been a central feature of China’s mediation-oriented diplomacy.
The outbreak of the Gaza war, however, exposed the tensions inherent in this approach. China’s response generated dissatisfaction on both sides rather than securing unequivocal acceptance from either. In October 2023, Israel’s Foreign Ministry criticized Beijing’s failure to explicitly condemn Hamas’s attack. From the Israeli perspective, the absence of a clear condemnation undermined China’s credibility, while China’s position also contrasted with that of influential Arab partners that explicitly condemned Hamas. At the same time, Beijing’s reluctance to take a more direct position on Israel’s military campaign, its limited involvement in efforts to manage the Red Sea crisis, and its decision not to join the maritime coalition against the Houthis raised questions among regional actors—particularly Arab states—about China’s capacity to act as either a responsible great power or a reliable security partner. The consequences of this approach have also extended to China’s economic interests. During the Red Sea crisis, transportation and insurance costs for a standard container shipped from China to Europe reportedly increased from approximately $1,500 to $4,000. This was particularly consequential because a substantial share of China–EU maritime trade traditionally passes through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
China’s concern that its economic interests could become entangled in regional conflicts has therefore functioned as a form of risk aversion, creating a significant barrier to decisive intervention in the management and resolution of Middle Eastern conflicts. Western interventions in security crises—including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have also served as cautionary lessons for Chinese policymakers. Many Chinese policymakers and scholars have long viewed the Middle East as a “graveyard of empires,” arguing that major powers throughout history have paid a heavy price after becoming deeply entangled in the region.
This perception has produced two important consequences. First, Beijing has tended to remain disengaged from regional turmoil unless its core interests are directly threatened. Second, it has increasingly relied on the security architecture maintained by Western powers, effectively benefiting from the regional security order without assuming comparable security responsibilities.
Such free-riding, however, may generate a long-term strategic dilemma for China. If Beijing remains committed to non-interference, it may leave greater space for other powers to shape the future regional order—potentially in ways detrimental to Chinese interests, particularly if that order is shaped by a strategic competitor such as the United States. Conversely, any significant Western military retrenchment from the Middle East could create a security vacuum that places China’s economic interests at sudden and unexpected risk. A further constraint is Beijing’s strategic prioritization of the Taiwan Strait and the limited military resources available for simultaneously protecting Chinese interests across multiple theatres. Over the past decade, the development of China’s strategic “march toward the Middle East” has been among Beijing’s most significant efforts to diversify its external strategic environment and reduce U.S. concentration on China’s immediate periphery. Yet under Xi Jinping, China appears to have concentrated much of its military and logistical capacity in the East China Sea and around Taiwan.
The growing frequency of Chinese air and naval exercises between 2020 and 2023 reflects the increasing strategic importance of Taiwan and the surrounding maritime domain. China’s expanding use of gray-zone tactics—including military aircraft, drones, and naval vessels—has further demonstrated the extent to which Beijing’s security priorities remain concentrated in East Asia. This strategic concentration inevitably reduces the resources and attention available for sustained military engagement in the Middle East. China’s lack of military alliances with regional powers, combined with its relatively limited logistical and military infrastructure in the region compared with the United States, further constrains Beijing’s ability to project military power.
The contrast with the United States is particularly striking. Washington maintains an extensive network of military bases and logistical facilities across the Middle East, whereas China’s principal formal military facility in the region is its dual-use support base in Djibouti. Although this facility provides Beijing with an important foothold for protecting maritime interests and supporting limited operations, its capabilities remain considerably more restricted than those available to Western powers for sustained large-scale military operations. The central paradox, therefore, is not that China lacks power in the Middle East. China possesses substantial economic leverage, expanding diplomatic influence, and growing political visibility. What it lacks is a comparable willingness—or capacity—to bear the security costs associated with exercising great-power influence.
This creates a fundamental distinction between power and responsibility. China can mediate, invest, trade, and negotiate; but when regional crises demand coercive leverage, military deterrence, logistical capacity, or sustained security commitments, the limits of Beijing’s model become increasingly visible. The question facing China is consequently not whether it can become a major power in the Middle East. It already is. The more difficult question is whether Beijing is prepared to pay the strategic costs of becoming a security power. Until that question is answered, China’s Middle Eastern strategy is likely to remain characterized by considerable influence—but limited commitment.
Image credits: Photo by Nick Fewings on Unsplash
Mohammadreza Mohammadi
Mohammadreza is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Tehran University of Science and Research, Iran. With a dedicated focus on the Middle East since 2015, he has authored and translated over 10 books and published more than 15 scholarly articles in his field. His expertise encompasses issues related to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, crisis studies and Iran Issues. Currently, he serves as a university lecturer, Vice President of the Center for Future Research of the Islamic World (IIWFS), and Associate Editor of the scientific journal Fundamental and Applied Studies of the Islamic World.
